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Gregory Fox*
I am very glad to follow Professor Christiano, because I would
like to speak in international legal terms about the issue he addressed in philosophical terms: that is, to what extent can a democratic political system protect itself against erosion or destruction
from within. This question is obviously at the core of the debate in
Turkey. That debate essentially asks whether the Turkish political
process is sufficiently open to discussion of the Kurdish issue, or
whether even discussing the issue threatens the integrity of the
Turkish state. At present, it appears that for the Kurdish question
to be resolved through political compromise as opposed to force of
arms, the Turkish political process will need to open its institutions
substantially. Until then, peaceful resolution does not appear
possible.
Whether this in fact occurs lies in the realm of political speculation. What I would like to focus on today is the question of
whether the Turkish political process is now sufficiently open to
accommodate the Kurdish debate in terms dictated by public international law and, more specifically, the law of human rights. First,
I will give some general background on the international law that
bears on this question. Second, I'd like to discuss two recent cases
brought before the European Court of Human Rights dealing directly with the Kurdish debate in Turkey.
Let me start out at a very general level and describe how
human rights law views the issue of political participation and the
potential exclusion of political actors from the political process. As
recently as ten years ago, to say that international law sought, as a
normative goal, to protect democracy would have been an extraordinarily controversial statement. If one looked at instruments and
resolutions produced by the United Nations or other international
organizations, the word "democracy" almost never appeared. But
events of the late 80's and early 90's have worked a revolution in
this area and today, it seems one can't look at any instrument of
international law without finding a reference to democratic participation, openness, transparency, accountability, or the other values
generally associated with democratic systems. So, I believe it is not
an exaggeration to say that the promotion of democracy has be* Senior Fellow at the Orville H. Schnell Jr. Center for International Human Rights,
Yale Law School.
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come an objective of public international law and of those international organizations dedicted to implementing international norms.
International actors have articulated a number of reasons why
the international legal system has moved so strongly behind the
goal of promoting democracy. Democratic systems are seen as being self-policing in their respect for human rights; that is, independent judiciaries and diverse civil society sectors are expected to
expose human rights abuses and deter future misconduct. In this
way, the necessity of ongoing international supervision would be
minimized.
And then there are systemic reasons for democracy. International relations theorists are now debating a proposition referred to
as the "democratic peace thesis." This holds that democratic
states, in general, do not go to war with each other. While they
frequently go to war with other kinds of states, the data are impressive in showing that democratic states almost always find nonforceful ways of resolving their disputes. This is not an uncontroversial thesis by any means, but it is widely accepted. Taking it
as a point of departure, many now argue that one of the fundamental goals of the UN system - that of maintaining international
peace and security - would be substantially advanced by encouraging transitions to democracy. More democracy, some argue, will
lead to more peace.
This is not the place to review objections to this hypothesis.
Suffice it to say that it is widely accepted enough to pose the following dilemma to the Turkish case: if there are compelling systemic reasons to support the promotion of democratic governance,
how is the international community to react to anti-democratic actors threatening - or potentially threatening - the integrity of
democratic states? We just heard from Professor Christiano that
the essence of a democratic system, in the traditional view, is a
process that is equally open to all voices regardless of the policies
they espouse. In some cases those voices may include parties or
individuals who are simply using democracy as a vehicle to attain
power, though they themselves share very few "democratic" values. In fact, their agenda may, explicitly or implicitly, be at odds
with the very idea of electoral democracy. The clearest instance of
such a case would be a party advocating the end of the electoral
process itself. It may instead favor a hereditary monarchy or a theocracy. Or perhaps the party supports including certain groups
(women, ethnic minorities) from the political process. Or perhaps
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they promise to impose religious laws in place of secular laws. The
difficulty, obviously, as we just heard, is how a process committed
to openness confronts parties and individuals who take the absolute opposite view.
This dilemma was very much on the minds of those in the
post-World War Two era who drafted the major human rights instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil And Political Rights, and, more relevant
for our purposes, the European Convention on Human Rights.
More specifically, the drafters were thinking about the experience
of Nazi Germany and the fact that the Nazi party first achieved
political power by election to the Reichstag. The Europe of the
1930's also saw many democratic systems in which Fascist, NeoFascist, and Communist parties were scoring impressive victories in
national elections. In the minds of the drafters of human rights
instruments, permitting these profoundly anti-democratic forces to
take advantage of the openness of democratic systems was a major
mistake that could have been averted. In their view, rightly or
wrongly, early and prescient action to exclude these parties from
electoral systems might have played a role in avoiding the horrors
of the Second World War.
The drafters of these instruments decided that it was important to build mechanisms into these treaties that would allow democratic states to protect themselves from anti-democratic actors.
These mechanisms appear in different articles in the different treaties: Article 5 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
Article 17 of the European Convention, for example. These articles provide that no right enumerated in any of the treaties can be
used as a justification for the suppression of any other right. In our
case such articles mean that the enumeration of a right to political
participation - which is in all of these human rights treaties cannot be used as justification for anti-democratic actors who attain power to suppress rights of others. Political parties can't say
simply that because they win 51% of the election, they therefore
acquire the right to end a system of free and fair elections, exclude
women from education, discriminate against racial or religious minorities, or to shut down newspapers. All these actions would be
violative of other articles in human rights instruments.
These clauses create a textual basis for excluding individuals
or parties who incorporate these sorts of policies into their electoral platforms. These textual provisions have formed the basis for a
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number of decisions by international human rights bodies. Quite
early on, the European Court of Human Rights upheld bans, first,
on a German Neo-Nazi party and then on the Nazi Communist
party. The UN human rights committee has upheld an Italian ban
on a neo-fascist party and a Canadian ban on a White supremacist
party. This jurisprudence makes it fairly well established in human
rights law that anti-democratic actors are not legitimate players in
the democratic process.
If such bans strike you as bizarre abnormalities, it is important
to keep in mind that the principle they embody is very much consistent with another aspect of human rights law: the condemnation
of hate speech. The United States obviously takes quite a different
view of this issue, since the First Amendment requires the government to be content neutral in any restrictions it imposes on speech.
But, for example, the UN convention on racial discrimination and
Article 20 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights not only
permit states to suppress hate speech, but create affirmative obligations to ensure that hate speech does not enter the national political discourse. The race convention extends that obligation to
racist organizations as well.
For the U.S. this is quite difficult to understand given our First
Amendment history. Thus, when the U.S. ratified the Political
Covenant, we took explicit reservation to Article 20. But for most
of the rest of the world this is not a controversial matter. And so
neither is the exclusion of anti-democratic actors. Both rest on the
view that the democratic process need not function as a "suicide
pact" that tolerates and protects the seeds of its own destruction.
One may conclude that the principle of a narrow democratic
process is fairly well established in human rights law. To state this
principle, however, is really not to answer the hard questions.
Under what circumstances may anti-democratic actors be excluded? What are the evidentiary standards that must be met?
What aspect of a party's program or platform should an international body review in order to decide that it represents a demonstrable threat to the democratic system?
Here, the debate has ranged between two camps. First, there
are those who say there must be a demonstrable, immediate threat.
The group must have a widespread following. It must engage in
acts of violence and we must know exactly what its political program portends. This view is similar to the criminal law doctrine of
self-defense which requires an immediate threat to one's personal
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safety. The problem with that argument, of course, is that if a democratic society waits until an anti-democratic party has a widespread following and is well organized enough to engage in
violence, then suppressing that party may produce a backlash and
itself lead to civil unrest. The point at which a party represents a
demonstrable threat to democratic institutions, the argument goes,
is already too late for the state to take effective action.
What would be the alternative? The opposing view to the "demonstrable threat" camp would permit states to ban parties when
they're quite small, and there is little likelihood of a backlash. To
take the example of the German Nazi party once again, proponents
of this view would argue that it would have been better for Germany to take action before the elections of 1932 when the Nazis
became the largest party in the Reichstag. The difficulty with this
view, of course, is that there is much less evidence available that
small parties actually constitute a threat to the democratic system.
They may not have much of a track record, and their platforms
may be underdeveloped or vague. This view, therefore, invests
much faith in the subjective judgments of the government officials
imposing a ban. And, as America's own history regarding the
Communist Party suggests, such judgments can often be wrong!
Let me turn now to my second topic, which is the two cases
decided by the European Court of Human Rights involving Turkish bans on political parties. It is interesting to note, by the way,
that Turkey has (by a large margin) been subject to more claims
than any other European state before the European Court of
Human Rights. As of 1998, there were 1825 matters pending
against Turkey in the European Court. Italy was in second place
with 1191 and then came the Netherlands with 131. So the disparity is quite large. These two cases mentioned involved action
taken, first, against the United Communist Party of Turkey in 1991
and, second, against the Socialist Party of Turkey in 1992. Both
parties were banned by order of the Turkish Constitutional Court.
The Turkish government argued before the Court that because
these two parties encouraged dialogue with the PKK, they had
called into question the idea of a unified Turkish citizenship and
nationality and thereby advocated a political process in which a
separate national identity within Turkey would become realized.
The Court held that both bans violated the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court stated that the essence of democracy is dialogue and that this was all these parties were
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promoting in regard to the PKK. It held they were not advocating
secession or any other policy that would disrupt the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. They were simply proposing an alternative to the armed struggle and this the Court found to be
perfectly legitimate. The two decisions do not fit squarely within
the paradigm of bans on anti-democratic actors, for Turkey did not
argue that the two parties were a threat to democratic values as
such. Rather, the threat was posed to the character of the Turkish
state and to civil order. The Court appeared to hold that neither of
these values was sufficiently protected by human rights law that it
could justify the bans. Of course, this is not a non-controversial
holding.
The United States fought a civil war to protect its own territorial integrity, as have many other central governments. The answer
of the European Court is that these are issues to be worked out
within the democratic process and do not themselves pose threats
to the integrity of that process. The Court seems to be saying that
a Turkey engaged in debate over the Kurdish question, or perhaps
even denuded of its Kurdish-dominated territory, may remain democratic nonetheless. These are possibilities in a pluralistic society,
and the European Court does not seem to be prepared to protect
open societies from the divisive consequences of airing these points
of view.

